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CHAPTER I 
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO 
CONTEMPORARY ACTION 
Augustine says "What, then, is time? If no one asks 
me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who does 
ask me, I do not know."l; something similar may be 
said about "thoughtful action." How does the human agent 
integrate the cognitive and ethical demands involved in 
acting? Within the constant change of social structures 
and the continual expansion of intellectual horizons, what 
is the connection between action and thought? What are 
the limits of cognitively judging action? These questions 
presuppose that one does not act merely in response to 
cognitive concerns, but rather one acts in response to 
many varied factors. Humans act in response to beauty, 
survival, habits, tradition, and hope as well as many 
other experiences. 
Theologically, 
thought and action, 
theology, reflection 
the concern is not only one of 
but also one of tradition. Within 
on action is informed by religious 
tradition. Although the importance of tradition varies 
all theologians f~om theologian to theologian, almost 
1 
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incorporate traditional, anthropological, ontological, 
ethical, and epistemological concerns within contemporary 
theories of action. David Tracy is one theologian who 
attempts a "revisionist" understanding of the Christian 
tradition. Inherent in his revisionist retrieval of the 
Christian tradition is a contemporary model for Christian 
action, and the concomitant criteria of authentic 
Christian action. In order to understand the background 
for his criteria of judging a contemporary model of 
action, the historical changes of the last three centuries 
and their transformative influence must be briefly 
examined. 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Thought 
One of the goals of the Enlightenment was to remove 
all illusion from the human agent and to allow rationality 
to guide human action toward the "good" and 
Towards this end, the Enlightenment did 
the "true". 
expose 
illusions present in both civil and religious life 
the eighteenth century.2 The "innocence" of 
Enlightenment philosophy and theology was revealed 
many 
during 
pre-
in a 
way which spelled the loss of certainty in conceptual and 
practical thinking. The post-Enlightenment search for 
meaning seems now to be achieved only through the use of 
3 
diverse models, all of which are dependent in varying 
degrees on the critical demands of the Enlightenment. 
Enlightenment rationalism is still present, but it 
took only a 
within the 
short time before critics found illusions 
Friedrich "illusionless" Enlightenment. 
Nietzsche's prediction of nihilism, for example, removed 
meaning from both philosophy and theology.3 Sigmund 
Freud identified the role of the unconscious in human 
thought and action, and so showed that self-conscious 
rational reflection was not the sole motivation for human 
action.4 Karl Marx criticized the Enlightenment and 
post-Enlightenment thinkers for accepting an idealistic 
epistemology. For Marx, idealism in epistemology led to 
"theological prejudice" and "materialism," both of which 
are illusions.5 Because of this criticism of 
criticism, contemporary thought, language, and action 
involve diverse and often contradictory models.6 
Post-Modern Pluralism 
The pluralism of the "post-modern" world affects 
human experience, 
exaggeration to 
confronted with 
thought, and action. It is no 
say that all disciplines are now 
plural models of interpretation. The 
advancement of the physical sciences and the development 
4 
of computer technology, as well as the immense amount of 
published material in every field, continue to challenge 
the inquisitive person with more information than can be 
examined. The "post-modern" environment requires an 
awareness of the interconnectedness of previously isolated 
disciplines. This is especially true within the 
humanities and social sciences; the disciplines of 
sociology, psychology, anthropology, history, linguistics, 
philosophy, and theology now recognize that they are 
mutually 
authority 
necessary conversation partners.7 Claims of 
by any one discipline have become suspect 
because of this necessary dependence. 
many possible models for thought and 
The existence of so 
action 
becomes overwhelming and burdensome, but this 
can no longer be denied. 
at times 
pluralism 
Paralleling the diversity of models in the scholarly 
community has been the fast paced increase in 
in contemporary society as a whole. The 
information 
increase in 
information is a "reality" for every individual exposed to 
the media of television and newsprint. The existence of 
such a media system, conveying information from around the 
world in only minutes, necessitates a drastic increase in 
the experiential world. This expansion involves a 
recognition of the ethical obligation one has to the 
approximately five billion "others" who populate this 
5 
planet. Requests for help no longer arrive only from 
one's local neighbor. In fact, for many people, the 
condition of overwhelming need has caused a modern dilemma 
for action. 
A Shift of Horizons 
As society and culture become more and more complex 
there is also greater complexity in the field of 
theological ethics. These changes are co-incidental with 
a shift of horizons within ethics. A change has occured 
in Western Christian ethical thought which can be traced 
to a 
early 
ethical 
marked change in soteriology. 
twentieth century, the Roman 
thought seemed to focus 
As recently as the 
Catholic church's 
on legalistic and 
penitential criteria. The Protestant churches focused 
many of their ethical models within structures of 
predestination, salvation, and sin. Both Protestant and 
Catholic ethics found themselves somewhat limited by their 
soteriological horizon. 
In the Roman Catholic church, fine distinctions 
between types and degree of sinfulness seemed to be the 
ruling demand for an ethicist. Charles Curran 
persuasively argues that the change in soteriology from a 
high Christology to a low Christology has changed the 
6 
landscape of moral concerns. 
An older 
from above 
abstract. 
redemption 
concrete.a 
soteriology associated with Christology 
tended to be private, extrinsic, and 
A Christology from below understands 
as social, intrinsic, and very 
In a similar way, the Protestant churches concerned 
themselves with establishing specific criteria for 
salvation. Calvin was very explicit in the connection of 
salvation with ethical action.9 Johnathan Edwards, 
following within the Calvinist tradition, preached that 
only by "divine operation" were people able to do good and 
so were also predestined for salvation.lo The 
Puritans demanded adherence to strict social guidelines in 
order to assure membership. The desire to assure members 
of salvation was a common theme of these churches. 
Both Protestant and catholic theologians began a 
turn away from an abstract soteriology toward a greater 
emphasis on anthropology and experience in the early 
twentieth century. The contemporary concern became the 
human agent acting in relation to the social world which 
she or he faced.11 There was a consequent shift from 
a concern with the future to a concern with the present. 
Finally, a shift from individual justification to 
community-based ethics had an impact on the condition of 
7 
ethical models. These major movements in ethical models 
have altered the way in which Christian ethics is 
understood as a discipline and who the conversation 
partners should be in developing an adequate model for 
Christian action. 
The increase in significant models for action and 
the simultaneous increase in awareness of the global needs 
of the world community have a seemingly paralyzing effect 
on the human agent. With the shift in horizons of the 
past century contemporary ethicists are beginning to 
discuss the perceived paralysis, and offer reflections on 
how to resolve the dilemma. Richard R. Niebuhr explains 
the contemporary condition: 
He lies pathetically enmeshed in the 
"constant contact news" and has no hour of 
sabbath rest, when he is not made to be a 
the abrading or engulfing sensations 
men.12 
network of 
the day, no 
sharer in 
of other 
Niebuhr's analysis does not end in pessimism, but develops 
a model of action based on "inventing." In order to act 
in the present day, one must invent, that is, act by 
"moral imagination" as a means of "forming 
oneself ."13 The alternative for Niebuhr is 
... routine existence in the crowd, where the 
individual is simply "one" who does what "one does" 
and belongs to the anonymous society called "they," 
[and which] offers the blessedness of a sleeping life 
in which he is deaf to his nerve endings.14 
8 
Niebuhr's alternative is one which shows the result of 
inauthentic action. 
assessment of the 
necessary for the 
establish certain 
authentic action. 
If Niebuhr is correct in his 
contemporary situation, it seems 
Christian theological tradition to 
criteria which will point us toward 
A Theological Response 
What are 
the paralysis 
the discussion 
ambiguity is 
the contemporary resources for overcoming 
of action? From a theological stand point 
surrounding hermeneutics, truth, and 
one fruitful place to begin. The reality 
which one faces in the contemporary world is complicated 
by issues 
experience. 
contemporary 
of hermeneutics, "truth," and the ambiguity of 
After Heidegger and Hegel, and with the 
figures of Derrida and Ricoeur, the 
of language and hermeneutics for the 
of reality has become central for many 
Heidegger's often-quoted dictum "Language is 
importance 
understanding 
theologians. 
the house of 
importance of 
contemporary 
major figure 
ties to any 
Being" highlights the contemporary 
a coherent hermeneutic element in 
models for action. Heidegger has also been a 
in redefining "truth," which he inherently 
concept of being.15 In order to look at 
9 
the foundations of one's action, one must confront the 
questions involved in "truth" and language. 
In addition to the importance of "truth" and 
language, ambiguity is present in historical and everyday 
experience. The introduction of aabiguity as a central 
theological category has been an important movement in a 
systematic understanding of our experience and 
action.16 Radical ambiguity, for example, is present 
in the historical event of the holocaust, as this event 
has acted as an interruption in the thought and experience 
of Western civilization.17 Internally, ambiguity 
presents itself when no choice relieves the tension of 
experienced need and temporal constraints. Most actions 
appear to be both good and evil, both true and untrue. 
The ability of acting in response to the coaplex of 
cognitive, cultural, linguistic, affective, and aesthetic 
issues has become increasingly difficult in contemporary 
theology. 
Christian theology as a discipline needs to confront 
this complex of issues and at the same time to retain its 
ties to the historical tradition of Christianity. 
Theologians 
nor their 
ability of 
plurality 
can abandon neither their academic integrity 
role within the Christian tradition. The 
humans to act "authentically" in light of the 
and ambiguity in all spheres of life must be 
10 
analyzed, and a coherent meaningful account of human 
action must be established within the Christian tradition. 
If contemporary models of action may no longer deny 
the need for a hermeneutical element, and if every 
theological system must accept the ambiguous nature of 
"truth" and experience, an arguaent can be made that David 
criteria for "authentic" action are relatively 
within the pluralism of the post-modern 
Tracy's 
adequate 
condition. His work on a new hermeneutical model for 
interpreting the 
of disciplines 
"Christian fact" involves a broad range 
and complex philosophical and linguistic 
analysis. This is a major component of his recent work, 
but in addition, I will argue that he has developed an 
implicit model for human action and a set of criteria 
which judge action as authentic. Tracy's main focus in 
the last fifteen years has been the "plurality" which is 
part of the "post-modern" condition,18 and he has 
articulated the effects of plurality on fundamental, 
systematic, and practical theology. This is not, however, 
the only possible reading of his material. Implicit in 
all of Tracy's work are his criteria for authentic human 
action which are dependent on his analysis of plurality, 
but are never completely subsumed into this analysis. 
Tracy is most explicit about a developed terminology 
for his criteria of authentic human action in Chapter 
11 
Five of Plurality and Ambiguity.19 He uses three 
terms to describe his view of informed "Christian" action: 
"resistance," "solidarity," and "hope."20 The 
evolution of these concepts occurs throughout Tracy's 
three major works: Blessed Rage for Order (henceforth 
BRO), The Analogical Imagination (henceforth AI), and 
Plurality and Ambiguity (henceforth P&A).21 
"Resistance," "solidarity," and "hope" cannot be 
understood without the background created by these three 
works. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will use the 
term "analogical action" to designate the complex model of 
human action developed through each of Tracy's writings, 
and I will use authenticity as a tera to describe the 
result of Tracy's criteria for acting in a "aanner worthy 
of a human being."22. Several terms and qualifiers 
are used by Tracy to describe action and its role in 
relation to the complex of issues involved in fundamental, 
systematic, and practical theology. He frequently uses 
"praxis" to establish a base aodel in his discussion of 
action.23 He also uses Lonergan's aodel of self-
transcendent action as a foundation for analogical action. 
Resistance is a criterion for authenticity which involves 
a constant demand for critical reflection. In addition, 
"resistance" takes on more concrete ethical application in 
when it is connected with an opposition to 
12 
certain 
with the social structures. Solidarity oppressive 
oppressed 
in the 
evolves out of Tracy's deaand for dialogue, and 
end, questions the limits of dialogue itself. 
Finally, hope is necessary for a conteaporary Christian 
interpretation of "authentic action." Hope involves the 
religious dimension of every aspect of life. One faces 
limits in both language and experience, one also faces 
evil and ambiguity in every day situations; hope allows 
for the possibility of acting at all in the face of both 
finitude and evil. 
The interplay 
traditional demands 
between 
is the 
"authentic 
intellectual, ethical, and 
horizon within which a 
action" becomes possible. determination of 
Tracy describes 
above all else 
the "authentic" person as one 
to the full aff iraation of the 
"committed 
ultimate 
significance of our lives in the world."23 I will 
use this desire for aeanlng to engage and interrogate 
Tracy's texts as a aeans of establishing a more 
comprehensive understanding of "authentic action." There 
are limits to any linguistic articulation of action, and 
this project will explore the possibilities as well as the 
limits of a contemporary model for action. 
A 
CHAPTER II 
AUTHENTIC ACTION AS A FOUNDATIONAL ELEMENT 
IN BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER: 
THE BEGINNING OF ACTION AS RESISTANCE 
foundation aust be established on which 
contemporary criteria for "authentic" action aay f iraly 
rest. Blessed Rage for Order establishes such a 
foundation through Tracy's appropriations and 
reinterpretations of fundamental theological concepts. I 
will attempt to simplify the complexity of BRO by 
visualizing it as a pyramid with three levels. The 
level is Tracy's insistence on a critical stance for 
thought and action. The second level involves 
appropriation of aodels of truth and aeaning. The 
first 
all 
his 
third 
and final level introduces fiction, evil, and fact, which, 
when taken together, establish the necessary framework for 
discussing Christ as the representation of "authentic 
action." 
The foundation established in the three levels 
allows Tracy to take the first steps toward a set of 
criteria 
eleaents 
for 
make 
"authentic" action. Six 
up the three levels of BRO: 
13 
foundational 
level one 
14 
critical stance; level two - meaning and truth; level 
three - fiction, evil, and fact. The three levels come to 
a synthesis in Christ. Tracy claims that Christ " ... has 
all the power of a coaplete and true manifestation of the 
fundamental meaning of authentic human existence."1 
In order to understand how Christ represents the criterion 
of "authentic action," the base of the foundation must be 
laid. 
Level One: The Critical Mandate 
From the outset of BRO, Tracy continually demands 
that a theologian take on a "critical posture." To be 
critical, for Tracy, does not involve a siaply negative 
view of every theory and model. 
But critical 
inquiry, a loyalty 
a willingness to 
lead.2 
does aean a fidelity to open-ended 
to defended methodological canons, 
follow the evidence where it may 
He thus establishes three concrete characteristics of the 
critical posture of the theologian. 
In order to understand the practical applications of 
this critical stance these characteristics require further 
examination. First, one must be faithful to "open-ended 
inquiry," which disallows any predeterained boundaries to 
the investigation. In order to remain critical, all areas 
15 
must be open to inquiry, including all doctrines, dogmas, 
and traditions. Second, the critical stance must retain 
certain loyalties. 
The fundaaental loyalty of the theologian as 
theologian is to that morality of scientific knowledge 
which he shares with his colleagues, the philosophers, 
historians, and social scientists.3 
This morality involves " ••• autonoaous judgaent, critical 
reflection and properly skeptical hard-
aindedness •••• "4 A loyalty such as the one Tracy 
establishes is not fixed; rather, it continues to evolve 
within certain paraaeters. By this loyalty's very 
establishaent, creativity and change are always present as 
each investigation allows for further criticism and 
reforaulation. Finally, his critical stance requires one 
to extend every inquiry as far as possible. The extension 
of logic and imagination continue to produce new horizons 
which must be exaained by the critical investigator. The 
sum of these three characteristics becoae the ground for 
the possibility of authentic action. 
The deaands of the critical stance exist in everyday 
life just as they do in acadeaic pursuits. A critical 
stance helps to inform the human agent before he or she 
can authentically participate in the worlds of 
education, coaaerce, or family. If one is to take on 
Tracy's critical posture in everyday life, one cannot 
16 
accept, without question, the statements of the 
government, the church, or the advertising industry. Once 
individuals begin to accept, in an uncritical way, the 
inforaation of the culture, they begin to lose sight of 
their own integrity. 
Level Two: Meaning and Truth 
In order for huaans to act and think in response to 
the ethical, aesthetic, and cognitive experiences of their 
culture, a model of meaning, whether conscious or 
unconscious, must be accepted and used. Ricoeur's model 
of the text is Tracy's first coaponent in foraulating a 
theory of aeaninq.5 Tracy begins his analysis of the 
text as a source of aeaning by outlining the historical 
development of heraeneutical thought. He outlines the 
movement from "proof texts" devoid of historical contexts 
to the primary importance placed on historical 
consciousness. Following froa historical consciousness, 
the introduction of the heraeneutical circle has been an 
iaportant but liaited historical aoveaent.6 The 
problea involved with many interpretations of the 
"heraeneutical circle" is the insistence on a 
psychological 
interpreter.7 
sharing 
Tracy 
between the author 
wants to avoid the 
and the 
pitfalls 
17 
involved in an overdependence on historical consciousness 
and psychological sharing in his model of interpretation. 
Tracy uses Ricoeur's her•eneutical model as a way 
to avoid these proble•s. Ricoeur's revision of the 
hermeneutic circle involves his theory of distanciation. 
For a proper understanding of Ricoeur's model, three 
iaportant parts of discourse need to be initially 
exaained: the speech event which is the specific act of 
speaking and occurs in a specific place and time; the 
language which is an ate•poral system of symbols; and, 
finally, the text, which is a fixed unit of discourse 
reaoved by its codification from its specific historical 
setting.8 
A rather in depth analysis of Ricoeur's aodel of the 
text is necessary in order to allow Tracy's concepts of 
fact, fiction, and iaaglnatlon to be understood. Meaning, 
for Tracy, is based on possibilities and on the 
imaginative world of the text. Meaning is not confined by 
what is established through historical critical aeans. At 
the saae time, the aeaning is not completely relative, but 
depends on the internal linguistic coherence and the 
internal "sense" of the text. Tracy uses Hans-Georg 
Gadamamer's model of a "fusion of horizons" to establish a 
base for his aodel of aeaning.9 
(TJhe reader overcomes the strangeness of another 
horizon not by empathizing with the psychic state or 
18 
cultural situation of the author but rather by 
understanding the basic vision of the author implied 
by the text and the mode-of-being-in-the-world 
referred to by the text. 10 
The initial point Tracy appropriates from Ricoeur 
involves how and where one finds aeaning. Tracy argues 
that the speech event and the meaning are not the same. 
The speech event or "intended" speech of the author, has 
of ten been understood as the "real" source of aeaning. It 
has been taken for granted that if one could understand 
what the writer intended or if one could listen for what 
the speaker "really" aeant, one would there find the 
"meaning" of the dialoque. Instead Tracy claims that, 
written language, 
literary genres, is 
because it suppresses 
in order to fix and 
11 
especially language codified in 
an intending (a •einen), 
the original speech-event 
retain the aeaning intended. 
The "suppressing" of the speech-event is a aove away from 
a hermeneutic based on a shared consciousness. In this 
way, the psychological intention is no longer the key in 
establishing aeaning in a discourse. The aeaning is, in a 
sense, in the text itself, and no longer can be obtained 
through psychological or historical analysis of the 
author. 
A second distanciation occurs in Rlcoeur's textual 
heraeneutic by what he terms a "reforaulation of the 
'dialectic of explanation and understanding'."12 
19 
This involves two more hermeneutical terms: the "sense" of 
the text, and the "referent" of the text. "Sense" and 
"referents" are teras which Ricoeur finds useful in his 
search for a clear conception of aeaning. The "sense" of 
a text is a coapletely internal explanation of the way 
a word refers to other words in any text. It allows for 
the possibility of expla!ninq any word by using 
internal references included within the text and the 
language systea employed by the text. Yet, the "sense" of 
a text is only the first step towards aeaning. The 
"sense" offers an "explanation" of the text but does not 
allow for a full "understanding" of the "meaning" of the 
text.13 
The process of "understanding" a text requires the 
use of external "referents."14 The question is: "To 
what aspects of reality, ordinary or perhaps 
extraordinary, do these texts refer the reader?"l5 
An understanding of the meaning of a text is obtained 
through a coabination of the sense of the text with the 
possibilities to which the text refers. A very iaportant 
distinction must be explicitly foraulated at this point. 
The "referents" of the text do not refer to the "meaning 
behind the text (such as the author's intention or the 
social-cultural situation of the text), but to the meaning 
'in front of the text.'"16 Tracy clarifies this 
20 
understanding by citing two types of referents "in front 
of the text": the object referent and the subject 
referent. The object referent ls the "•ode of belng-in-
the-world which the text opens up for any intelligent 
reader."17 These are the iaaginative possibilities 
which the reader of the text aay see. The subject 
referent is the "personal vision of the world" implied by 
the author. This is not obtained solely through a 
historical critical method, but through a linguistic 
analysis of the vision internally developed within the 
text. 
The use of Ricoeur's hermeneutical model is a key 
element in Tracy's developaent of "authentic" action. 
Opening up the concepts of meaning and understanding to 
notions of possibility rather than certitude allows Tracy 
to view action and fiction as closely tied. As will be 
seen below, when meaning is dependent on a text which 
offers possible modes of being in the world, action ls 
able to appropriate these worlds into authentic concrete 
acts. The iaportance of fiction for action takes on 
greater importance when the fiction is released from a 
strictly historical analysis and becomes a symbolic 
structure which inforas action. Tracy's eaphasis on 
pluralism requires a heraeneutic which does not liait but 
expands the possible interpretations of a text and he has 
21 
found 
theory 
such 
of 
a heraeneutic in Ricoeur's model. 
meaning is established the inevitable 
Once a 
question 
arises of how this pluralistic view can ever be "true." 
Truth 
The aissing piece of level two is Tracy's model of 
truth, which interlocks with his aodel for meaning and 
allows for meaningful action. He does not use one 
specific aodel for "truth" throughout BR0.18 
Instead, he allows the term to develop as it is used. In 
spite of Tracy's lack of a specific definition for truth, 
there is one aain supportive model in Tracy's development 
which is of special interest to the present concern with 
action: Heideqger•s aodel of truth as aletheia. 
Heidegger retrieved his understanding of aletheia from 
the early Greek understandings of truth, and he argues 
that the early Greeks understood aletheia not as an 
issue of correspondence but rather as an issue of 
disclosure.19 
Aletheia as a model based on disclosure is not a 
static model 
thinking and 
aletheia. 
of truth, but has an active component. 
acting of huaans is directly tied 
For Heidegger, the question of truth is 
The 
to 
a 
question of Being; he says "the essence of truth is the 
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truth of essence."20 One aight interpret this as 
saying that it is in the disclosure of other beings that 
one coaes to realize truth. Dasein, which is Heidegger's 
term for a thinking huaan being21, is the place where 
disclosure occurs. Dasein, although it is his term for 
human being, is often referred to as a place. Dasein is 
the place, the "where", of disclosure. It is the 
engageaent with reality which allows for truth, for only 
when one engages the "other" does disclosure occur. 
An iaportant revision of the truth which Heidegger 
introduces is the dialectical nature of truth.22 
Considered with respect to truth as 
disclosedness, concealaent is then undisclosedness and 
accordingly the untruth that is aost proper to the 
essence of truth.23 
Heidegger is making a claia to soaething which he knows 
goes against common sense and logic. How can any concept 
of truth be dependent at its core to its antithesis? The 
paradox of this claim is not overlooked by Heidegger. In 
fact, he says because of the paradox one must 
logically renounce the stateaent.24 In spite of 
its illogical character, Heidegger retains truth as an 
instance of both disclosedness and concealaent. Tracy's 
use of aletheia, with its dialectical character, 
radically opens up his arguaent for "authentic" action to 
the plurality and aabiguity of experience. 
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Tracy uses aletheia as the backdrop to his own 
model of truth. For Tracy, to claia that an experience or 
linguistic expression is true, it must be "adequate to 
experience." The need for disclosure is tied to a 
transcendental need for adequacy to the liait situations 
of experience. He does not point out, however, that the 
dialectical nature of aletheia contains within its 
definition his desire to understand religious language and 
experience as limit situations. Liaits are experienced as 
both disclosive of and concealing the possibilities 
present in each encounter of the world.25 Only 
through the disclosure does one realize that there is also 
a liait - (a concealment) - in experience. Tracy's use of 
Heidegger as a base aotif in his aodel of truth is more 
powerful 
aletheia 
than 
will 
he adaits. Therefore, I believe that 
prove helpful in his discussion of 
ambiguity. 
The second level of Tracy's foundation brings 
together two aajor f iqures and constructs an interlocking 
system which revises two of the aost basic concepts in any 
theological analysis. If meaning is determined by the 
possibilities in front of the text and truth is understood 
as a dialectical structure of disclosure and 
the deteraination of criteria for authentic 
shift its horizon. The new horizon for 
concealment, 
action must 
theological 
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criteria of authentic action has shifted from an abstract 
and definitive structure to a new model of practical 
possibilities. The criteria of truth and aeaning allow 
for the possibility of meaningful action. For 
something to be aeaningful it aust pass two criteria: it 
must be "genuinely disclosive of our lived 
experience"26, and it aust involve the advanceaent of 
"more encompassing modes of personal and societal 
transforaation."27 This requires meaning and truth 
to have additionally a transforaative quality. 
is 
the 
The introduction of an element of transforaation 
very iaportant in Tracy's analysis. It allows for 
beginning of a connection between theory and action. 
there seems to be a gap in this connection. Why do 
Yet, 
truth 
and meaning include transforaation, and what criteria will 
judge the nature of a desirable transformation? This may 
only be answered by the introduction of three further 
categories: fiction, evil, and fact. 
Level Three: The Christoloqical Synthesis; Fiction, Evil, 
and Fact 
With a clearer understanding of the possibilities 
for meaning and truth ve can now look with Tracy at the 
central symbol for action: the Christian texts and the 
Messiah they introduce. 
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Tracy synthesizes all of the 
important 
chapter 
aeaninq 
Christian 
project, 
characteristics for "authentic" action in his 
on Christology. He uses his interpretation of 
and truth to show that Christ is the center of the 
tradition, and aore importantly for the present 
that Christ is a uniquely powerful symbol of 
"authentic action." 
He begins by calling for a rereading or "over-
hearing" of the Christian texts. His heraeneutical model 
requires him continually to view the texts as occasions 
which allow for "singular moaents of a redescription of 
life's possibilities and a transforaative reorientation 
of life's actualities"28 Understanding is never 
simply cognitive, but always involves action in the fora 
of transformation. 
The transformation occurs through attention to three 
central cate9ories: fiction, evil, and fact. He first 
establishes the need for fiction as an intrinsic human 
quality. Second, he shows that "evil" is a fact of the 
huaan situation. Finally, he distinguishes between facts 
as "actualizations of possibilities" and facts as "re-
presentations of possibilities." By establishing these 
three points he not only establishes his argument for a 
Christocentric view of Christianity, but further develops 
the criteria which will determine "authentic action." 
26 
Fiction 
Human beings need story, symbol, image, myth, 
and fiction to disclose to their imaginations some 
genuinely new possibilities for existence; 
possibilities which conceptual analysis, committed as 
it is to understanding present actualities, cannot 
adequately provide.29 
This statement brings up several teras which will require 
further discussion. Tracy's view of imagination, his 
understanding of possibilities, and the power of symbolic 
language are all keys to understanding his position. 
First the meaning of fiction and its use in the process of 
human transformation must be examined. 
For Tracy, fiction ls not a negative term. 
"Fictions do not operate to help us escape reality," 
rather fictions are key syabollc frameworks which allow 
humans to experience reality aore fully and to be 
transforaed by these experiences.JO He fights 
against the common understanding of fiction as an escape 
mechanisa or a simple redescriptlon of our present 
reality. Fictions are soaething other than either of 
these ideas, they "open up our minds, our imaginations, 
and our hearts to newly authentic and clearly 
transforaatlve possible aodes-of-belng-in-the-
world."31 These re-presentations are neither mere 
fantasies or banal pictures; they are aodels by which one 
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often reorients one's most basic attitudes. 
The need for fiction cannot be established using a 
metaphysical arguaent of necessity. Tracy does not try to 
prove philosophically the need for fiction. Rather, he 
relies on common human experience and the history of 
western thought to establish his position as adequate. 
"The modern form of Pascal's wager aay well have become 
the risk of entering laaginatively into the fictional 
worlds."32 
How are these fictions to be judged? Which fictions 
represent the true, the good, and the beautiful aodes-of-
being-in-the-world? These questions point out the state 
of autual dependence which exists between judging a symbol 
systea and acting authentically. 
Only Aristotle's "just aan" can adequately distinguish 
the stories of true justice from injustice. Only 
Lonergan's self transcending huaan being can be 
trusted to weigh the relative real strengths and real 
weaknesses of coapeting character forming ayths. 
Highly "subjective" criteria, to be sure. But 
criteria which somehow as a aatter of fact 
suffice.33 
For Tracy, the "character forming ayths" and "authentic" 
modea of being are interdependent. Tracy appears to have 
hit a limit situation in his analyais, or more 
appropriately, he has entered into a new version of the 
hermeneutic circle. It ls a revised circle which is not 
only hermeneutical, but may also be described as a 
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symbolic/ethical circle. For Tracy, the validity of a 
symbol depends on its ability to transfora human beings. 
In addition, the one who is to validate the symbol is only 
so qualified because he or she has already been 
transformed by such a syabol system. This leaves the 
validation of a specific symbol system entrapped in a 
circle. The influential models of Aristotle and Lonergan 
are self correcting, but is there a way out of the circle 
and into a aodel which enables a logical and verifiable 
path to "authentic action?" This question may only be 
answered with further investigation. 
Tracy introduces a second criterion which is similar 
though methodologically different from the first. The 
second criterion is 
cites Ernst Bloch's 
a Marxian model of praxis. He 
contemporary formulation: "Besides 
theory and practice, true praxis also needs 
appropriate personal and societal syabols."34 
Praxis requires the interplay of theory and practice, 
with an appropriate symbol structure if it is to inform 
the active life towards transformation. Tracy has 
inserted his criterion of transforaative symbol structures 
into a traditional understanding of praxis. If both 
the need for symbolic structures and the recognition of 
the transformative character of action are recognized, 
their synthesis, if pursued to its end, aay establish the 
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criteria for "authentic action." 
At this point we begin to notice a gap which exists 
between cognitive categories of aeaning, meaningfulness, 
and truth and the practical category of "authentic 
action." 
and retain 
that there 
Is there a way to move between these two areas 
a critical posture? Tracy implicitly claims 
is and continues his argument using the 
background of the praxis dialectic as an accepted aodel. 
His development of fiction as a category of possibilities 
refines the discussion and atteapts to fora a bridge 
between concept and action. A further analysis of this 
aoveaent of the imagination will be necessary, but at this 
point further development of the foundational eleaents is 
required. 
Tracy's argu•ent for a revisionist Christology as a 
basis for authentic action aust now focus on the fact of 
evil in huaan existence. Tracy uses Ricoeur's discussion 
in Freedom and Nature to establish that human beings 
possess a metaphysical necessity for both freedom and 
nature.JS The problem is how to understand the 
experience of evil, which is not merely error, without 
destroying the necessity for freedom. Tracy again returns 
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to common human experience as the source for establishing 
the "reality" that all huaans, both individually and 
societally, commit evil.36 His preliainary 
conclusion agrees with the aainline Christian theological 
tradition, which understands evil as an inevitability 
rather than a necessity. 
His next step is to raise the conteaporary 
theological view as a further means of establishing beyond 
doubt the existence of evil. Reinhold Niebuhr has been 
one of the most thorough and articulate recent advocates 
of the pervasive nature of evil. For Niebuhr, in order to 
begin to create a aodel for human transformation one must 
first accept the 
persuasive argument 
fact of evil. Tracy 
as the impetus for his 
uses Niebuhr's 
criticism of 
contemporary culture's self-perceived "innocence." He 
cites the horrors of the twentieth century and wonders how 
it is possible that the American culture can continue to 
claim innocence. He further challenges revisionist 
theologians to use the anthropology established by the neo-
orthodox theologians as a base for all theological 
inquiry.37 The neo-orthodox theologians, Niebuhr 
being a good example, make very strong arguments for the 
necessity of a coaprehensive model of evil in any 
theological system. Using this base Tracy suggests that 
any model of "character-forming action" must study all 
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available symbols which may transform the condition of 
evil. 
Evil acts as an interruption to both the criteria of 
a symbolic/ethical circle and a conteaporary model of 
praxis. Evil exists not only as error but as 
distortion, deformation, and negation of the desire to act 
authentically. Both Aristotle's just person and 
Lonergan's self-transcending individual, if they remain 
buaan also reaain prone to doing evil. By stressing that 
all human beings are prone towards evil, Tracy reshapes 
his criteria for authentic action. Symbolic structures 
are 
into 
which 
useful in so far as they allow evil to be transformed 
the good, the just, and the true. The interruption 
evil causes in an attempt to act authentically is a 
fact. 
without 
One cannot develop a contemporary model of action 
acknowledging and persistently struggling with the 
interruptions evil causes in the transformative process. 
Common 
possibility." 
Greek tradition 
sense understands a fact as an "actualized 
This conception of facts goes back to the 
and is taken for granted in Western 
contrast to these "facts" stand "mere 
These possibilities are products of the 
thought. In 
possibilities." 
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imagination, which remain fantasies until they are 
concretely actualized in the daily life of a specific 
person. 
Tracy wants to expand the common conception of fact 
to include some of these "mere possibilities". He states 
that, in addition to actualized possibilities, "re-
presentations" of possibilities in "disclosive symbolic 
language and action" also should be termed facts.38 
The initial response to this redefinition of fictions as 
facts aay be one of reluctance or indifference, but the 
acceptance of this model for facts is crucial to Tracy's 
entire systea. 
They are facts: facts, to be sure, not as 
actualization of a possibility but facts as ritual, as 
fictional, as symbolic representations of a real 
possibility. All genuine re-presentations are not to 
be assigned to the category "•ere-possibility" but to 
the category of "fact."39 
This may seea at first to be a matter of "mere semantics," 
but with the importance of language in modern 
understandings of reality, to say "•ere seaantics" is 
contradictory. 
How one understands and names one's experiences is 
very iaportant and may determine the way in which one acts 
toward those experiences. By establishing previously the 
need for fictions, Tracy now pushes for an interaction 
with these necessary fictions as facts. 
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That is, the 
characters which become "larger than life" in a fiction 
are truly-(that is disclosively)-"more faithful to the 
aeaning of our experience than everyday experience 
1tself ."40 We aust return to our discussion of 
fiction in order to reiterate that this does not imply 
that fictions help us to escape from our "reality". 
Fictions, as facts, engage us more deeply in reality and 
draw us towards the actualizations of imagined 
possibilities. 
This is not true only in fictions, but historical 
persons becoae "larger than life" and begin to represent 
possible modes of being in the world for entire cultures. 
The "symbolic dimension" of the lives of Martin Luther 
King Jr., Gandhi, Oscar Romero, or Dorothy Day have had 
and continue to have lasting significance in the cultures 
they represent. These figures become syabols of a mode of 
being which otherwise may be thought of as a mere 
possibility. When these figures take on a symbolic 
character, the evil which was present in each of their 
lives is subordinated to the ethical, political, 
religious, and hopeful possibilities they come to 
represent. These woaen and aen represent what it means to 
live "authentically." 
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Christ as Authentic 
In the Christian tradition the ultimate and limit 
representation occurs in the life of Christ. Tracy 
establishes Christ as the representation of how life may 
be lived in relation to a loving God. This does not mean, 
for Tracy, that Jesus had to have actualized all of the 
events and actions which are attributed to his life, or 
that Jesus had to have been self conscious of his "divine 
character". 
Rather we need to know what his words, his 
deeds, and his destiny, as expressions of his off ice 
of messiahship, authentically re-present as real huaan 
possibilities for genuine relationship to God.41 
Christ becoaes the liait symbol of the Christian 
tradition's search for a symbolic representation of 
"authentic human existence".42 Christ is not the 
only symbolic re-presentation of a relation to God; but 
for a Christian, Christ is the aost meaningful and true re-
presentation. The inclusive character of Tracy's 
Christology does not aake his view completely relative. 
Although it may allow many possibilities, there are only 
certain symbols and persons which act as disclosive of the 
limit experiences in life. 
The importance of plural symbolic representations, 
in addition to the uniqueness of one representation for 
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each religious community, is very important when 
attempting to understand how one acts in a plural world. 
claiming a symbolic structure as true allows one to 
encounter the world with a vision of possibilities 
informed by one "supreme fiction". A "supreme fiction" 
allows a community to live together with a shared vision. 
Though the community has one central fiction, there 
remains a plurality of practical manifestations and 
reinterpretations of the community's tradition. 
A meaningful understanding of Christ, for Tracy, 
requires the six conceptual reinterpretations which he 
presents in BRO. In addition, if authentic action is to 
take as its central symbolic structure the Christ and the 
stories which traditionally surround him, a continued 
reinterpretation of Christ must be pursued. Action, 
informed by a multidimensional symbolic structure, becomes 
a complex issue which entails a spiraling relationship 
between symbol and act. The actions of a person cause 
reinterpretations of the symbolic system, and the symbolic 
systea, though reinterpreted, is fundamentally stable and 
initially informs the actions of the individual. The 
heraeneutic circle ls thus revised into a spiral. The 
interaction of act and symbol aoves beyond the two 
dimensional constraints of the circle to a three 
dimensional system. The spiral is the path of an 
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individual seeking to act authentically, but many gaps 
remain in the spiral as each individual confronts the fact 
of evil. To continue the spiraling interaction between 
symbol and action the category of imagination must be 
further examined. The potentially transformative 
an "analogical imagination" is the next step 
struggle for "authentic action." 
use of 
in the 
Achieving criteria for "authentic action" is a very 
complex task. It involves consulting many diverse 
disciplines including philosophy and theology. As has 
been shown above, it also involves linguistic, 
hermeneutical, ethical, and anthropological concerns. One 
begins to understand the importance of a dialectic between 
interpretation and ethical action as one uncovers the role 
which cultural symbolic structures play in everyday life. 
In order to continue to develop criteria of "authentic 
action", we must analyze the importance of the symbolic 
structures which embrace and inform us. At the same time, 
we may not lose sight of the critical stance which 
requires all symbols to be open to reinterpretation, 
reformulation, and possibly negation. The desire of this 
analysis is to understand the conditions for and the steps 
toward acting authentically. Yet it seems that the 
analysis itself, so based on theories, language, and 
thought, is frustratingly removed from action. can we 
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continue to search for understanding without losing sight 
of our goal: acting, and acting authentically? The 
existence of this project itself claims that we may; and 
that discourse, understanding and education are components 
of "authentic action". 
CHAPTER III 
THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION AS 
A CRITERIA OF AUTHENTIC CHRISTIAN ACTION 
The missing link between thought and action in 
Tracy's writings aay be coapared to Lessing's "ugly broad 
ditch." It seeas at tiaes iapossible to understand how 
the complexity of BRO aay becoae a practical set of 
criteria for authentic action. In BRO, texts offer a 
world of real possibilities which could be, but what 
of the need to be concrete and the demand for practical 
criteria of authentic action? An "analogical imagination" 
may be the needed link, an iaagination which may be able 
to appropriate the world of thought, though it be so 
different, into the world of action. The idea of an 
analogical iaaginatlon ls not simply an iaagination which 
can see the the world of thought and action as like 
one another. Rather it is an laagination which recognizes 
the "similarity-in-difference." That is, it focuses on 
both the radical difference between thought and action 
and, siaultaneously, on the similarity which actually 
exists. 
The three final points established in Blessed Rage 
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for Order left our criteria of authentic action enhanced 
but incomplete. First, people need fictions, fictions 
which provide possible modes of being in the world. 
Second, people have an innate tendency towards evil which 
may interrupt the potentially transformative possibilities 
in any fiction. Finally, both fictions and evil are facts 
and so entail real possibilities and real interruptions 
for action. The foundation of BRO is given depth and 
religious significance in AI. The depth occurs in the 
movement toward an increasingly radical nature of 
meaningful possibility in front of a text. When a fiction 
is understood as a religious classic it produces a world 
in front of the text which has ultimate meaning for human 
action. 
The Classic 
The category which allows Tracy's argument to 
progress is the introduction of the classic. Classics are 
"those texts, events, images, 
symbols which are assumed 
possibilities of meaning and 
persons, rituals, and 
to disclose permanent 
truth."1 The movement 
from a fiction to a classic rests most significantly with 
the issue of permanence. Classics persevere as disclosive 
and transformative symbols from generation to generation. 
The classic is 
"classicist" nor is 
neither a symbol 
it the latest fad 
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confined to the 
of contemporary 
culture.2 Tracy argues against a "pop art" view of 
the classic which depends on each individual's "aesthetic 
sensibility." In contemporary culture, a move towards 
autonoay and freedoa has instilled a desire for each 
individual to determine what is and is not art. For many 
people, what should and should not be a classic has become 
a matter of purely individual taste. For Tracy, it cannot 
be a matter of individual choice. Rather, the classic's 
very definition demands that each classic depend on a 
traditional and cultural heritage to determine it as a 
classic. 
Classics and Truth 
In attempting to understand the truth claims of a 
classic, more than one model of truth is necessary. Both 
the metaphysical and transcendental aspects of fundamental 
theology, and the disclosure/concealment model of 
systematic theology require the further criteria of 
transformative praxis. "Hore concretely, there is never 
an authentic disclosure of truth which is not also 
transformative."3 Theologically it is important to 
recognize the indebtedness owed to the practical 
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theologians who have clearly pointed out the limits of 
metaphysical and disclosure models of truth.4 
Practical theologians differ on aany aspects of 
"praxis," but Tracy cites a central positive proposal 
accepted by most praxis oriented theologians. 
Any proper understanding of praxis demands some 
form of authentic personal involvement and/or 
commitment. Any individual becoaes who he or she is 
as an authentic or inauthentic subject by actions in 
an intersubjective and social-historical world with 
other subjects and in relationship to concrete social 
and historical structures and movements. Praxis, 
therefore, aust be related to theory, not as theory's 
application or even goal as in all conscious and 
unconscious aechanical notions of practice or 
technique. Rather praxis is theory's own originating 
and self correcting foundation, since all theory is 
dependent, minimally, on the authentic praxis of the 
theorist's personally appropriated value of 
intellectual integrity and self-transcending 
coaaitaent to the imperatives of critical rationality. 
In that sense, praxis sublates theory, not vice-
versa. 5 
Tracy accepts the centrality of praxis as one 
criterion for truth, but will not allow praxis to become a 
model beyond criticism. Praxis, if allowed to be sole 
judge and jury, may lead to corruption, distortion, and 
inauthentic action. Only by requiring praxis to be open 
to criticism from theories of disclosure and critical 
rationality can praxis become a relatively adequate 
criterion of the truth status of a classic. 
Conversation remains for Tracy the central category 
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in any discussion of truth. In his view, once the 
possibility of conversation has been eliminated 
distortions and illusions often pass for truth.6 For 
the classic to claia to be true it will require plural 
interpretations as well as the appropriation of these 
interpretations in actions. Action is not merely an 
afterthought to the interpretation of a classic. Rather, 
the acts which the classic produces will be one of the 
criteria which will deteraine the truth and adequacy of 
the classic. 
The Classic as Gaae 
The classic ls an active object which involves the 
subject in a disclosive relationship.7 In order for 
a classic to be authentically experienced, for Tracy, one 
aay not remain autonoaous, removed, or indifferent to the 
work. Rather, the initial encounter with the classic 
involves a loss of control of one's subjectivity. Tracy 
uses Gadaaer's model of the game to further elucidate the 
nature of one's encounter with the classic. 
I do not experience a subject over and against 
an object with my subjective consciousness in complete 
control. Rather I experience myself caught up in a 
relationship with the work of art in such a manner 
that I transcend my everyday self-consciousness and my 
usual desires for control.8 
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The game becomes a disclosive model for how the subject 
initially encounters the work of art. The classic "grabs" 
or "pulls you into" the world which it presents. The loss 
of autonomy is iaportant in phenomenologically 
what occurs when one encounters the classic. 
describing 
One first 
encounters, then interprets, and only after the world in 
front of the text is presented, does one begin to 
criticize the classic. The three steps involve a critical 
correlation between the experienced world and the demands 
of one's intellectual integrity. One can neither lose 
sight of the critical deaand of one's mind or become so 
engrossed in critical theory that one is no longer able to 
encounter anything. The model of a game remains 
relatively adequate for describing the encounter with the 
classic, only to the degree that it recognizes the need 
for a critical correlation between the encounter of a 
classic and the deaands of critical rationality. 
The dissolution of the autonoaous self and the 
suspension of critical reflection in the presence of a 
classic does not negate or destroy the possibility of 
plural interpretations. The suspension of one's critical 
stance is siaply that, a suspension; it does not remove 
the need for critical reflection to be an integral part of 
one's overall experience of the classic. Critical 
reflection is reclaimed when one steps back from the game 
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and recognizes the game's rules as rules. The game model 
highlights the need to initially experience the classic 
without the intellectual protection of the autonomous post-
Enlightenment thinker. 
When I enter a game, if I insist upon my self 
consciousness to control every move, I am not in fact 
playing the ga•e. Rather I am playing some curious 
game of my own where self consciousness is the sole 
rule, while any vulnerability and any ability to 
transcend myself are the forbidden moves in the only 
role or game I am willing to play. 9 
It is by engaging in the risk of the game that we allow 
ourselves to experience the power of the classic. 
Works of art have the ability to transform people, 
if only for a brief time, by their new and often unique 
view of reality. 
Here the back and forth movement of every game 
becomes the buoyant dialectic of the true freedom, 
surprise, release, confrontation, shock, often 
reverential awe, always transformation.10 
Allowing praxis to act as a criterion for truth involves 
an analogous entrance into the game of human action. When 
one wishes to act in a meaningful way one risks the 
possibility that one's actions will be inadequate, 
misinformed, or systemically distorted. The risk of 
attempting to act authentically is a risk often plagued 
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with disappointment. In order for one's actions to remain 
potentially authentic one must retain the ability of 
critically correlating theory, symbol, and action.11 
In order to allow a work of art to transform us, we 
must be willing to teaporarily relinquish our control. 
This seeas to be a very dangerous risk. How do we know 
that the classic we encounter is a classic that will 
transform evil and not produce it? The classic may be an 
art work which has had a transformative effect on people 
from generation to generation, but does this absolutize or 
authenticate the classic beyond revision and beyond error? 
The classic involves a vision of possibilities which has 
stood the test of time, yet we know history is not beyond 
error.12 If history may involve the distortions of a 
patriarchal church and a history which has forgotten the 
poor, then we must choose our classics with care. We must 
find some way to judge the classics as adequate to the 
task of transforming evil into truth and goodness. The 
classic should also be judged on its ability to transform 
injustice, oppression, and hatred into justice, 
solidarity, and love. 
Judging the Classics? 
Before one can begin to judge the different classics 
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of any culture or tradition, one must first attempt to 
understand who the self is and what factors one brings to 
the judging of a classic. Tracy discusses this question 
in his analysis of the reception of the classic. For 
Tracy, an individual comes to any classic with a 
preunderstanding • 
.•. the preunderstanding of the subject is itself 
informed, both negatively and positively, by the 
history of the effects and influences of the classic -
including the history of the effects, influences, and 
interpretations of this classic text in the 
culture.13 
Because one cannot, in any easy way, adjudicate the many 
possible modes of being in front of the classics, one must 
realize one's preunderstandings and attempt to move 
towards an informed discussion of the complex ethical, 
aesthetic, transformative, and traditional demands of the 
authentic classic. It must be noted again that in spite 
of the difficulty of judging the classic there is a 
necessary order in the adjudication process. 
Ethical judgments seem far more heraeneutically 
appropriate after the interpretation of the "world" of 
the work as possible-mode-of-being-in-the-
wor ld .14 
The emphasis falls on when the judging occurs. Texts are 
often judged prior to their interpretation which leads to 
an inadequate judgment of the text. When the author's 
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political, religious, or ethnic background become 
determinate factors in judging a text, the judgment can no 
longer claim to be authentic. The text is "autonomous," 
and so any judgment of the text should remain exempt from 
prejudices against the background of its production. 
Tracy does not attempt here to judge the classics on 
specific moral issues, but rather calls for further 
conversation on the issue. His concern at this point in 
his argument is that one not aove to judgment without 
conversation. Conversation of this sort should include 
philosophers, social scientists, critical theorists, 
theologians, as well as the oppressed and poor. 
The Religious Classic 
There are various ultimate classics for Tracy; they are 
the religious classics which take an individual to the 
limit situations in his or her life. The religious 
classics hold one key to living authentically, because 
they allow for the possibility of the presence of God. In 
order for authentic action to be complete within any 
religious tradition, the religious classic must be 
examined as the source of possible aodes of being. 
Through correlating action, symbol, and theory, an 
interpretation of the religious classic may disclose the 
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truth present in the limit experiences of life. 
For Tracy, the religious classic "may be viewed as 
an event of disclosure of the 'limit of', 'horizon to', 
•ground to' side of religion."15 The reception of 
the classic also allows the community to be transformed 
through its invitation to new acts of resistance, 
solidarity, and hope. 
For in the actual aoaent of response to a 
religious classic, religious persons are convinced 
that their values , their style of life, their ethos 
are in fact grounded in the inherent structure of 
reality itself. In that response to a religious 
classic, religious persons seem to sense that there 
exists an unbreakable inner connection between the way 
one ought to live and the way things really are.16 
This statement at first seems to be a retreat from 
critical reflection and a retrenchment into a first 
naivete. Religion appears as a state of being which 
denies the world outside of the tradition and focuses 
solely on the actions and ethos described in the religious 
classic. Tracy is not atteapting to judge the religious 
experience here, but to explain it. He is attempting 
a brief phenomenology of what occurs when one responds to 
the religious classic. In the Christian religious 
classic, one enters a game where one finds a mediating 
symbol structure between the necessarily existent God and 
the actual experiences of society and culture. 
Tracy explains this game dynamic by using the 
traditional term 
response" with 
of 
the 
faith. The moment of 
Christian classic is one 
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"encounter-
of a risk 
which is analogous to the self abandonment of the game. 
He understands this as an authentic stepping into and 
letting qo of oneself. The experience of faith is not one 
of "imagine-reality-as-if-it-were-this-way" for reality 
is "that-way" in the encounter with the religious 
classic.17 In spite of the need for an initial 
abandonaent of self, Tracy acknowledges, and even 
requires, that faith reaain rooted in critical reflection. 
Critical reflection may lead one to a new interpretation 
of the religious experience and of the classic as an "as-
if" experience. But for the theologian, without the 
initial encounter of risk, there can be no authentic 
criticism of the religious classic. 
The religious classic is also different from the 
cultural classic because it has the ability to express the 
relationship of individual experiences to the "whole." By 
being religious, the classic is a "genuine manifestation 
of the whole fro• the reality of the whole itself ."18 
He sees the religious perspective as qualitatively 
different from morality, art, science, politics, or 
economics. Religion as religion cannot be absorbed into 
these components of life, but rather religion is what 
informs and sometimes transforms all of life. Religion 
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qua religion is the whole. 
The final point of understanding the religious 
classic is its dialectical character. We noted earlier 
that all classics have the dialectical character of 
disclosure/concealment. The religious classic is one 
source which has 
whole of reality. 
classic one enters 
limit situations, 
the power to disclose and conceal the 
When one encounters the religious 
a game which explains not only the 
but also involves practical 
understanding of our everyday experience. 
All great religious traditions have a 
element within the disclosure of the ultimate. 
Peruvians of the Incan tribe have lost much 
cultural heritage due to the Spanish conquest. 
mysterious 
The native 
of their 
Yet they 
still retain this sense of mystery when they speak of the 
mountains which surround the city of Hachu Picchu. The 
mountains, as well as all of the natural world, hold 
religious significance for the Indian tribes. It ls said 
that the mountains which surround the city of Hachu Picchu 
are mysterious because they only reveal a part of the 
beauty and magic of the forest on any one journey. The 
rains come so often and the mist is so dense, that on any 
five day trip there are always several sections of the 
trail which remain shrouded in mystery. The mountain 
controls the disclosure and concealment of its beauty, and 
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the guides who make the trek every week claim that they 
will never discover all the beauty and wonder which the 
mountains hold. Analogously a lifetime within a religious 
tradition reveals many things of the religion, but the 
mystics of every faith live knowing that there are always 
hidden moments of grace, and the whole is never wholly 
revealed. 
The Christian Classic 
In order to move from the general religious classic 
to a Christian model of authentic action, we must 
initially limit our discussion to the Christian classic: 
"the Jesus Christ event." As a Christian people, we 
recognize, "Jesus in the Christ event as the person whom 
God's own self is decisively re-presented as the gift and 
command of love."19 This initial definition of the 
Christian classic sets the backdrop to the dialectic of 
the Christ event. In the Christ event, we experience a 
dialectic of the "always-already" and the "not-yet." 
Jesus re-presents the "always-already" graced world and 
the "not-yet" realized event of God in each person and in 
history. 
The "always-already" defines, in a strictly 
Christian context, the possibilities which are always 
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present in front of the scriptures. These possibilities 
may be found in the parables, narratives, and apocalyptic 
writings of both the New and Old Testaments. These texts 
stand as continual reminders of how a life could be lived 
in relationship with the God of Jesus. God ls always-
already present in Jesus Christ, and yet the always 
already character of the Christ ls cautioned by the "not-
yet" experience of God in everyday life. 
The revealing, self-disclosing, comprehensible, 
present God who is always-already present to us is at 
the saae tiae the hidden, concealing, 
lncoaprehensible, even sometimes absent God of 
Christian experience.20 
Apocalyptic literature captures the temporal character of 
our lived experience of the "not-yet." In addition to the 
temporal character of the "not-yet" there ls also our 
experience of moral flnltude which ls expressed as the 
"not-yet" through the symbol of the cross.21 
Responses to the Christian CLassic 
Tracy highlights three paradigmatic responses to the 
Christian classic which are present in contemporary 
theology: manifestation, proclamation, and historic 
action. Each of these three responses claims to be the 
key interpretive model for understanding the relationship 
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between human beings and the God revealed in the Christian 
classic. Tracy accepts all three models as relatively 
adequate, but none as the exclusive interpretation of the 
Christian experience of God. 
Those who experience the Christian classic as 
fundamentally requiring a response of respect for the 
manifestation of God see an intense iaaediate irruption of 
God in experience. Manifestation occurs as both an 
affirmation of God's grace and a radical negation of the 
journey of the Christian. When manifestation is 
understood as the core of the Christian message a 
fundamental trust in God is the result.22 
The second paradigmatic response to the Christ 
event is the proclaaation of the Word of God. Tracy 
focuses on the neo-Orthodox Protestant theologians as the 
demonstrative group for proclamation. The Bible and its 
proclaaation is that through which one recognizes one's 
relationship to God and the world. Human sinfulness takes 
on a central role as the word confronts humans with their 
shortcomings and evil. 
They [the neo-orthodox theologians] demanded that the 
event of the proclaimed word the radical 
transcendence of God and the eschatalogical coming of 
God's Word into this world in the triumph of grace in 
Jesus Christ be kept steadily in view by all 
theology worthy of the name Christian.23 
The final response is that of historical action, and 
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is a very important response for our present study. Tracy 
focuses on the political and liberation theologians as 
contemporary examples of this response. The central theme 
in liberation and political theologies is a sense of 
praxis which acts as the judging criterion for both 
rituals and Word. The criterion of praxis neither negates 
proclamation or manifestation, but revises the 
significance of both models by reinterpreting the aim of 
both responses through the lens of action. 
CTJhe word event of proclaaation commands, the 
gift event of manifestation demands a singular 
recognition: the recognition of the primacy of praxis, 
action in and for a church and a global society 
groaning to be set free from the alienating events and 
oppresive structures in the contemporary 
situation.24 
The central theme of praxis replaces the centrality of 
either word or ritual. Ritual and word become only steps 
along a path of transforaative action. 
Tracy's analysis of the three responses does not 
conclude with one being more disclosive than the others, 
but instead he returns to a call for dialogue and 
conversation. He recognizes the importance of all three 
responses in the post-modern situation. But what remains 
central to his project is a call for pluralism and a fight 
against a reduction of theology into any one response as 
the only "Christian" response. 
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An Analogical Imagination 
sides 
Tracy has reaained cautious, always stating all 
and arguing for plural aodels instead of one "true" 
model. He has revised the fiction into a cultural 
and several cultural classics have been 
as religious classics. The religious classic 
become the ultiaate gaae which aust be risked: the 
classic, 
understood 
has 
game of life. But have we coae any further in knowing 
what it may mean to act authentically in the face of the 
paralysis cited by Niebuhr? Or do we still "lie 
pathetically" without any new means of viewing our actions 
as authentic or inauthentic? It appears as though we have 
complicated the situation more than siaplified it. 
Complexity aay be a part of what has occurred, but there 
has also been further disclosure of what our situation is 
and a trajectory has begun towards practical criteria of 
authentic action. 
Tracy does not end AI by simply stating the three 
responses to the Christian classic without taking a 
position himself. He synthesizes the work done so far in 
his model of the "analogical imagination." The analogical 
imagination is a means by which one may begin to 
understand the complexity and pluralism of the 
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contemporary situation. 
Once a focal meaning is chosen and formulated, 
the rest of the journey of a systematic analogical 
imagination begins. For then each theologian strives -
through critical interpretations of the core symbols 
in the full range of the Christian tradition and 
through critical interpretations of the realities of 
the contemporary situation - to find some ordered 
relationships for understanding the similarities-in-
difference in the whole: the realities globally named 
God-self-world.25 
Theology becomes a process a continual journey of 
understanding, criticism, and reinterpretation. The 
initial "focal meaning" is dependant on the geographical, 
socio-political, familial, and other varied factors of 
one's life. 
In attempting to synthesize what has ocurred thus 
far in our search for criteria of authentic action, it 
will be helpful to employ Tracy's concept of analogy as 
similarity-in-difference as the key for moving from 
thought to action. The two volumes discussed so far have 
focused on the methods, problems, and needs of the 
theologian qua theologian. We have desired to draw out of 
Tracy's theology an implicit model for human action and 
the criteria which judge that action as authentic. The 
problem has remained one of the radical difference between 
thought and action. 
There are many similarities between the means of 
establishing theological adequacy and the means of 
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establishing relatively adequate criteria of authentic 
action. Action, if it is to be authentic, requires a 
complex of interrelated forces. Is it not the case that 
in arguing for a critical stance in all of theology Tracy 
is analogously arguing for a critical posture for the 
authentic huaan agent? By claiaing that humans need 
fiction and that the religious classic stands as the 
ultimate fiction does not Tracy claia that authentic human 
action requires some symbolic structure, and the 
possibilities which that structure presents? Finally, is 
not Tracy's claim that theology requires a correlation 
between the experience of God, self, and world and the 
Christian classic also a call for the same in authentic 
Christian action? If Tracy's argument is adequate, then 
we may argue that authentic action involves similar 
criteria as the analogical imagination. 
What remains to be discussed in P&A are the specific 
criteria which Tracy establishes for authentically 
appropriating the Christian classic. These criteria will 
involve the critical stance developed in BRO, and the 
analogical imagination which has been established in AI. 
Without the ability to have a correlation between the 
religious classic and the experienced world, any claim to 
authentic Christian action appears inadequate. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESISTANCE, SOLIDARITY, AND HOPE 
IN THE FACE OF PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY 
Tracy uses specific and practical concerns 
initiates his 
more heavily 
as he 
falls most recent text. The focus in P&A 
on practical ways to act and 
authentic Christian action than it 
specific 
did in criteria for 
either 
authentic 
"analogical 
universal 
or 
are 
AI. The criteria of judging an act 
informed by the complex system of 
as 
the 
imagination." If we propose 
criteria of relative adequacy 
to 
for 
set forth 
authentic 
action it may be necessary to be specific on the limits of 
such criteria. Neither scholars nor beggars are the only 
people able to act authentically. Contemporary criteria 
of authentic action would seem to require the ability for 
all people to act authentically regardless of their 
social, geographic, economic, and political background. 
But ls this possible? Are there such criteria that may 
judge equally all people, at all times, and in all places? 
The plurality of Tracy's model of interpretation 
would seem to imply that there are no universal criteria 
of judging actions nor is there a universal model for 
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human action. Here we need 
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to make an important 
distinction between a model of action and the criteria 
which are used to judge actions. A model for action 
involves the specific steps which are taken in any action. 
Two examples of models of action are Lonergan•s model 
developed in Insight and an Aristotelean model of 
praxis.1 Tracy focuses on both these models at 
different times in his writings,2 but our focus has 
been and continues to be on the criteria which may judge 
actions as authentic or inauthentic. 
Criteria of relative adequacy, for Tracy, depend on 
the foundation established in BRO and AI. He develops 
three criteria for authentic action: resistance, 
solidarity, and hope. Though these criteria are only 
"relatively adequate", they are proposed as able to 
determine, with relative adequacy, the authenticity of an 
act for all Christians. I will argue for this claim in 
depth in the following chapter. Using the steps of 
adjudication explained above, we must first understand 
these three criteria before we can judge their relative 
adequacy. 
Resistance has its background in the first step of 
Tracy's project: the critical stance. Since the very 
beginning he has argued for critical forms of resistance 
within the academic community. He now extends this demand 
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for a critical stance into the broader social, economic, 
and political world. Solidarity is the practical 
application of resistance to the situations of everyday 
life. It begins with the theoretical understanding of 
conversation and an eaphasis placed on the comaunity 
rather than the individual. Actions based on the 
community's shared traditions, shared history, and shared 
classics, are acts of solidarity. Hope ls the final 
embracing act of Tracy's model of action. Hope is the 
risk of acting after one faces the ambiguities and 
interruptions of life. Hope is not blind, rather hope is 
strange and unusual, hope is our response to the limit. 
These criteria of authenticity receive further 
clarification and greater depth when Tracy develops them 
within the experiences of plurality and ambiguity. Both 
plurality and ambiguity describe characteristics 
criteria of resistance, solidarity, and hope. By 
of the 
further 
exaaining the radical nature of plurality and aabiguity in 
our experience we may better understand how the criteria 
of authentic action may remain useful in contemporary 
life. 
Language 
In P&A, Tracy maintains the high profile accorded to 
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linguistic considerations in his earlier works. Through a 
highly distilled discussion of contemporary work in 
philosophy of language and linguistics, he locates the 
major issues concerning plurality.3 
Tracy initially points out the inadequacies of both 
a positivist use of language and a romantic sense of one's 
"own" language. He states that positivism, as with any 
inquiry which claims to be talking about a "pure object 
out there" is no longer an adequate model of language or 
experience.4 Romanticism is equally unacceptable for 
Tracy because of its claim to a "truth inside the self" 
which does not need interpretation but only explication. 
Language is not an instrument that I can pick up 
and put down at will; it is always already there, 
surrounding and invading all I experience, understand, 
judge, decide, and act upon.5 
What has surfaced out of the debate over linguistics is 
the importance of language as a pervasive, ever present, 
horizon to our experience. The structuralist, post-
structuralist, deconstructionist, and semiotic analysts 
have highlighted the instability of language. 
Tracy is convinced that language is meaning-ful, and 
that meaning may be best understood through the category 
of discourse. He sees the existence of sentences, 
paragraphs, and texts to be signs that there is meaning 
within linguistic structures.6 Appealing to 
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discourse as an alternative to understanding language as 
system or use, Tracy argues that language, understood as 
discourse, relates experience to society and history. 
Language as system is inadequate because it does not 
allow for meaning in front of the text. Additionally, it 
is limited because of its emphasis on words alone when 
studying 
inadequate 
disclosive 
language. Language as use is similarly 
because it does not take into account the 
fact that language is in part a system of 
differences and opposites. When language is understood as 
use, it cannot take into account the autonomy of the text 
and the meaning present in the text apart froa the author 
who wrote the text. As a way of combining the two 
understandings of language, Tracy, borrowing from 
Beneviste, argues that language is best understood as 
discourse.7 Discourse is relatively adequate because 
it takes into account the previous views of language as 
use and system, while also attempting to study the meaning 
involved in the movement from words to sentences to texts. 
Why 
words to 
linguistic 
is that 
either of 
leaves us 
is it so important to study the movement from 
texts and the co-incidental increase in 
complexity? For Tracy the fundamental answer 
the world is meaningful. By moving away from 
the formal analyses of language, discourse 
in history and society. History, society, and 
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contemporary experience, though they may never escape from 
language, are different from language. 
Language understood as discourse, because 
recognition of society and history, also points 
need to "converse with one another on the 
Of its 
to our 
ethical-
political implications of all analysis of language and 
reality."8 Tracy here shows a strong connection 
between the interpretation of a text and the ethical-
pol i tical actions which will be informed by that text. 
Inasmuch as each possible world in front of the text is a 
social and political world, all texts take on an ethical-
political voice as they attempt to persuade one to act in 
certain ways. 
At this point we come to the connection between the 
classic - (the text and its interpretation as discourse) -
and action. Tracy's concept of action appears to be 
informed by two models of action: a self-transcendence 
model and a redefined model of praxis. The two models 
seem to be a tensive pair. Yet, Tracy understands a 
relatively adequate model for action to involve both of 
these models. His understanding of analogical action 
takes into account both self transcendence and praxis. 
Tracy tempers both his understanding of Lonergan's self 
transcendence and any Marxist utopian vision of praxis 
with an understanding of history as interruptive. 
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History as Ambiguity and Interruption 
In addition to Tracy's introduction of the classic 
into a traditional view of praxis, he also criticizes the 
idea of praxis when it becomes an idealized means to a 
utopian society.9 History as an account of past 
actions informs us that there is no continually 
progressive teleology but rather a history of 
interruptions. History is plagued with interruptions 
which instead of producing a clear meaningful tradition 
result in a history aost aptly described as ambiguous. 
Aabiguity aay be too mild a word to describe the 
strange mixture of great good and frightening evil 
that our history reveals.10 
Ambiguity is the tensive character of history itself. It 
is not the tension of disclosure/concealment, but an 
analogous tension of "great good and frightening evil" 
existing in the same event. The evil and good exist as 
"both/and" rather than "either/or" in history. An event 
may be portrayed by the history books as either good 
or evil but a more accurate view of history is one 
which explores both the good and the evil of an event. 
What does such a history disclose about the world 
in which we live? Foremost is the fact of evil in history 
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which cannot be ignored or minimized. Even for those who 
do not read the history of the great cultures, our recent 
heritage is enough to confirm the existence of evil in 
history. The holocaust of World War II in Germany is one 
stark 
effort 
example. The war in Ethiopia, which denies relief 
food to the victims of famine because of boundaries 
drawn by the the var, continues to be an ugly commentary 
on the extent of evil. What are these situations to be 
termed? Is evil or sin strong enough language to disclose 
the radicallity of these events? 
Tracy 
interrupts 
path taken 
describes history as interruptive. Evil 
what may have appeared to be a teleological 
by history. Even those seemingly great steps 
forward like the American colonization and revolution are 
not without interruption. The near complete destruction of 
the American Indians occurred within the great experiment 
of freedom we call the discovery of America. The list of 
interruptions in history is as long as that of historical 
events: the slavery of the blacks, the destruction of the 
Incan empire, the rape and subjugation of women throughout 
history. How can history be seen as moving towards a 
specific goal? It appears rather to be a wayward path 
without direction; a struggle marked by interruptions. 
Tracy presents a base motif of responsibility as an 
initial means of acting in light of history's 
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interruptions. He borrows from Abraham Joshua Heschel who 
insists: "Not all are guilty but all are 
responsible."11 Here responsibility is understood 
in the sense of being "capable of responding." It is a 
reponsibility which begins with the step of accepting 
ambiguity; accepting the complex dialectic of good and 
evil in history. It involves resisting any history which 
accepts only the good and views reality as a utopia. 
If one is to face history without a naive acceptance 
of history as a utopian drive toward truth and justice, 
then one must take on a critical posture.12 The 
conscious and unconscious ideologies of all history, and 
of the present, need to be questioned and often 
criticized. 
Ideologies are unconscious but systematically 
functioning attitudes, values, and beliefs produced by 
and in the material conditions of all uses of 
language, all analysis of truth, and all claims to 
knowledge.13 
These ideologies inform all our actions and thoughts and 
once we recognize their existence we must struggle to pay 
attention to their subtleties. 
To interpret history in all its ambiguity requires 
both a retrieval of the historical texts and events, and a 
suspicion of the ideologies which inform those texts. 
This raises again the issue of the classic and especially 
the religious classic. If the religious classic is that 
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to which we bring our limit questions and that which 
provides 
it seems 
a world of possibilities we risk entering, 
crucially important that we interpret 
then 
the 
religious classic with both a hermeneutic of suspicion as 
well as retrieval. 
Analogical Action 
Having placed ourselves within the instability of 
language and a history filled with interruptions, we come 
to the question of how the informed person may act 
authentically. It is assumed that the future will hold 
new interruptions and that the complexity of understanding 
our situation will only increase. If plurality and 
ambiguity are not to lead to a paralysis of human action 
then certain criteria of authentic action need to be 
proposed. Relatively adequate criteria of authentic 
action are proposed as means by which any model of action 
can be judged as adequate to the experiences of the 
contemporary person in the contemporary world. 
Authentic action may better be described at this 
point 
laid 
as "analogical action". The conceptual framework 
out by Tracy for the "analogical imagination" is a 
set of guidelines which will also inform a model for 
authentic action. "Authentic analogical action" will 
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involve the correlation of the religious classic with the 
contemporary situation of plurality and ambiguity. Such 
action will be open to many possibilities, not restricted 
to specific rules and strict guidelines of dogmatic 
interpretations. Authentic Christian action will 
interpret the past through a method of correlation with 
the present, 
the time of 
disciples did. 
and will not rely on a desire to return 
Christ in order to act exactly as 
These criteria of action require 
to 
his 
an 
analogical imagination which can inform the human agent 
of an imaense number of possibilities and critically 
appropriate these possibilities to the condition of human 
finitude. 
I maintain that resistance, solidarity, and hope are 
the criteria of authenticity for contemporary "analogical 
action". The foundation established in 1IBQ of a critical 
stance and the dialectic of fact and fiction support 
action. The possibilities of the classic and the 
understanding of the contemporary situation produce the 
horizon for action. The final move must be one which 
involves thought in all its possibilities and criticisms, 
but must not be restricted to thought. We may always 
think, but we must also act. The following sections will 
argue that the criteria of resistance, solidarity, and 
hope are criteria of relative adequacy for judging 
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authentic Christian action. 
Resistance 
Resistance remains, in many ways, 
theoretical criteria of the three proposed. 
the most 
Resistance 
begins with a critical stance and involves a hermeneutics 
of suspicion. Tracy understands all religions as 
exercises in resistance.14 For Tracy, in order for 
any interpretation of a religious classic to remain 
relatively adequate it must retain a critical correlation 
of the experienced world and the world in front of the 
text. Resistance remains a relatively adequate criterion 
of authenticity when it resists any pretense of purity, 
any statement of absolute authority, and any claim to 
complete autonomy. 
Tracy focuses his argument by citing the lives of 
people who have resisted the status quo based on their 
interpretation of the religious classics. These people 
have lived authentically through acts of resistance. 
People such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi 
have risked acting on their interpretations of their 
religious 
authentic 
classics.15 These people's 
action: action which resists 
lives represent 
the political, 
economic, and societal oppression of people. Yet no set 
70 
of resistive acts is universally authentic. In fact, to 
claim Gandhi's life or Martin Luther King's life as the 
way to act in all situations removes one from a critical 
stance and so from authentic action. 
One needs to understand the possibilities of 
resistance in an analogical way. One may resist by many 
diverse sets of acts. Regardless of the course of 
resistance taken, a critical correlation between the 
experienced world and one's faith in a religious classic 
remains a core requirement of authentically appropriating 
the religious classic. A Christian act is authentic in 
part when it resists the temptations to retreat into a 
classicist understanding of the Christian scriptures. At 
the same time authentic Christian action may not deny the 
meaning and truth disclosed by the religious classic. 
Authenticity involves living the tension between the 
ultimate reality disclosed in the religious classic and 
the critical questions provoked by human experience. One 
attempts to see the similarities between the resistance of 
Jesus Christ toward the Pharisees and the resistance we 
may have towards present religious elitism. Christian 
analogical action in the form of resistance does not have 
specific people or structures to resist; but attempts to 
act in a similar fashion to that of Christ, without 
denying the ever present differences. 
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Solidarity 
What conversation is to the life of understanding 
solidarity must be to the life of action.16 
Solidarity may be understood through its foundation 
in the analogy of conversation. Language itself elicits 
the recognition that we have certain preunderstandings and 
certain horizons determined by our language. Language 
also establishes a bond between very different people and 
invites conversation between those who otherwise appear to 
have no coaaon ground. 
Solidarity as a criterion of authentic action 
demands the denial of an autonomous self and an opening up 
to the other. "Between person and person, as well as 
between person and text, there exists in every authentic 
conversation an openness to mutual transformation."17 
In so far as conversation and authenticity are held 
together as analogous concepts, solidarity also demands an 
openness to other people as encounters of potential 
transformation. Actions which are open only to like 
minded friends and deny the ability to learn and be 
transformed by those who are different cannot claim to be 
authentic. Likewise actions which close a person off from 
experiencing the contemporary world and require one to 
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live in only familiar and conciliatory surroundings can 
not claim to be authentic. 
Solidarity does not suggest that differences are to 
be overlooked or brushed aside, but recognized as a part 
of the common human situation. In spite of our 
differences, 
relationship 
the religious classics 
with those different from us. 
bid 
The 
us into 
Christian 
classic invites us to be in solidarity with the poor, the 
oppressed, and the marginalized.18 Jesus Christ 
lived, worked, and taught the marginalized of society. We 
may have different ways of understanding who fits into 
these categories, but the possibilities set out by Jesus 
Christ exist as real possibilities for action in the 
contemporary world. 
One possibility of solidarity is the formation of 
community. 
the safety 
Actions of solidarity are actions which risk 
of individuality and threaten to break the 
welcome boundries of like-minded friends. When one steps 
towards the "other" and allows conversation, dialogue, and 
action to take over one enters the "game" of solidarity. 
Inherent in Tracy's idea of solidarity is a pluralism of 
potential actions, but the acts of solidarity are not 
"mere possibilities;" they are real concrete acts. Acting 
in solidarity with others is a risk, one which opens up 
the contemporary world of good and evil and invites one to 
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be transformed. 
The final criterion of authentic Christian action is 
that of hope. Hope is a criterion which does not have the 
intellectual nature of resistance or the practical value 
of solidarity, but rather takes on a spiritual nature. 
Hope is based in faith: the faith which is the risk of 
living according to the religious classic. 
The Christian religious classic has many faces, one 
of which is eschatological. It is a vision of what could 
be, and as a fiction is also factual as a real and 
possible world in front of the Christian classic. Hope in 
this vision is a reasonable hope for Tracy. It is hope in 
authentic conversation, liberation, and solidarity. Hope 
exists as the internal power of the human agent to act in 
light of the possibilities of resistance and solidarity. 
Authentic Christian action requires hope in the 
transformative potential of the Christian classic. 
Without this hope acts may become muddled in the conflicts 
produced by our experiences of plurality and ambiguity. 
Whoever fights for hope, fights on behalf of us 
all. Whoever acts on that hope, acts in the manner 
worthy of a human being. And whoever so acts, I 
believe, acts in manner faintly suggestive of the 
reality and power of that God in whose image human 
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beings were formed to resist, to think, and to act. 
The rest is prayer, observance, discipline, 
conversation, and actions of solidarity-in-hope. Or 
the rest is silence.19 
The closing lines of Plurality and Ambiguity show 
the connections between resistance, solidarity, and hope. 
When he states that those who act in hope act in "the 
manner worthy of a human being", he is alluding to what I 
have termed authentic human action. The criteria of 
resistance, solidarity, and hope enable one to judge the 
authenticity of an act in our contemporary world. The 
category of authenticity does not imply a moral or ethical 
standard of behavior. Rather, authenticity is a 
theological category used to judge actions on how well 
that action appropriates what is known of the world, the 
self, and the religious tradition. Moral, aesthetic, and 
civil judgments will also have to be made of any act, but 
in addition to our ethical and civil duties the question 
of authenticity remains important for contemporary men and 
women. 
CHAPTER V 
THE LIMITS AND HOPE OF ANALOGICAL ACTION 
Acting analogically involves the critical stance 
described in BRO, the factual possibilities of the 
religious classic, and a correlation of the religious 
classic with the contemporary world conditioned by 
plurality and ambiguity. Analogical action does not 
propose a model of specific steps taken in every action, 
but a set of criteria which may judge acts as authentic. 
The criteria of resistance, solidarity, and hope are only 
relatively adequate criteria which involve certain 
limitations. The theoretical complexity implied within 
the criteria of resistance needs to be cautioned by a 
recognition of the diversity of human intellectual 
faculties. The criteria need to be further developed in 
order to remain relatively adequate to a diverse 
population outside of an academic community of scholars. 
Though analogical action may at first appear as a 
criteria of authenticity applicable to only those with 
high levels 
criteria can 
allow almost 
of cognitive and abstractive abilities, the 
be revised into basic understandings which 
all people to use them. I will argue that 
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everyday practical experiences confirm Tracy's criteria of 
authenticity as applicable for most of the population. 
There are several questions which must be asked about the 
criteria of authentic action. What degree of 
understanding and critical reflection are necessary in 
order to act authentically? What level of abstraction is 
necessary in order to understand the similarity in 
difference of analogical action? What knowledge of 
historical ambiguity and linguistic plurality is necessary 
in order to act authentically? 
Several distinctions are initially required before 
we can attempt to answer these questions. First, 
authenticity and morality are not synonymous and they 
require very different criteria of judgment. What Tracy 
has established is not a set of criteria for moral action. 
He has argued that authenticity is a category involving 
rational, symbolic, and ethical criteria. Authenticity is 
not a judgment of a person's goodness or holiness. 
Rather, it is a category which we use when we speak of an 
integrated person, someone whose actions are done with a 
recognition of their relationship to the self, world, and 
God. 
One must 
authentically. 
be self-conscious 
Additionally, one 
in order 
must be 
to act 
"other" 
conscious for one's actions to claim authenticity in the 
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larger society. Finally, Christian authenticity requires 
one to be conscious of God. All three of theses states of 
consciousness may vary greatly in breadth and depth, but 
their existence is a minimal requirement for authenticity 
in its different levels. Authenticity, in this sense, 
does seem to require certain levels of conceptual and 
abstractive thought. 
What level of self conscious critical reflection is 
necessary to determine an act as authentic? Resistance 
seems minimally to require the recognition that all 
statements need interpretation. One can not accept a 
statement as fact, merely because it is stated as a fact. 
Resistance understood within this parameter, excludes 
children below a certain age from acting authentically. 
Young children accept their experiences without question. 
The ability to "fool" or "entice" children is a concern 
for most parents. Parents recognize something which 
children often don't: that "things are not always as they 
seem." The need to question one's beliefs, desires, and 
dreams is at the base of Tracy's criterion of resistance. 
One must not only learn to question, but one must 
learn to appropriate this questioning stance into one's 
acts. An action may be just and worthy of praise but 
remain inauthentic. Such a case occurs when the only 
response to the question "Why did you do that?" is 
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"Because I was told to." This scenario shows how Tracy's 
sophisticated understanding of resistance based on 
critical theological reflection can be understood in very 
practical terms. If one remains completely dependent on 
others for one's reasons of action one cannot 
authentically act. 
The second criterion of authentic action is the use 
of an analogical imagination and the need for conversation 
in order to act in solidarity with others. I have argued 
that solidarity as an adequate criterion of authentic 
action requires the ability to see others as both similar 
and different. I have also argued that solidarity 
requires the ability to engage others in conversation 
which is open to transformation. Both of these 
involve respect for the other. If one cannot 
enough to recognize a person with black skin as 
criteria 
abstract 
equally 
valuable as one with white skin, one cannot claim one's 
actions to be authentic. 
The skill of recognizing similarity in difference 
occurs very early in life; one example is when 
recognize themselves in the mirror. This 
children 
level of 
abstraction gains sophistication and begins to involve 
ethical and aesthetic judgments as one's abstractive 
abilities become more complex. In spite of the complexity 
of one's analogical imagination gained with age, at its 
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base an analogical imagination requires the ability to see 
radically different things as also having similarities. 
The desire to find common ground without denying the 
other's differences is a mark of solidarity. 
Equally important to solidarity is the need to be 
open to conversation with those who are different. If we 
remain so convinced of our own position we are unable to 
enter into a conversation at all, we are merely giving a 
persuasive speech but not conversing. All authentic acts 
of solidarity must be open to the possibility of real 
transformation. Without this quality there is no real 
encounter of the world outside the self. 
In order to claim an act as authentic one must also 
understand the plurality and ambiguity of experience. 
What level of understanding of plurality and ambiguity is 
necessary? Surely it is not necessary to understand the 
radical plurality argued for by Jacques Derrida in order 
to act authentically. Nor does it seem necessary for one 
to know the broad range of historical ambiguity to claim 
authenticity. This being the case, what are the levels of 
understanding required for authentic action? 
Plurality at its core recognizes that there is no 
single response in any given situation, but there are many 
possibilities. At the center of ambiguity is the 
recognition that "things don't always work out as 
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planned." Though these are great simplifications of 
Tracy's concepts of plurality and ambiguity, they appear 
as adequate reinterpretations under a very simplified 
cognitive horizon. In order to act authentically one must 
minimally recognize that one could have acted otherwise. 
Additionally, one must have had the experience of acting 
towards a certain end and receiving a very different 
result than expected. These experiences inform all 
authentic actors with the knowledge that all acts are 
potentially ambiguous and open to plurality. The use of 
plurality and ambiguity, understood on these basic levels, 
shows that neither category is exclusive or restrictive. 
Not all people can act authentically, because not 
all people can live by these basic reinterpretations of 
Tracy's criteria. Though the criteria do entail certain 
restrictions 
adults have 
of those able to act 
the capacity to act 
authentically, 
authentically. 
most 
In 
addition to the need for rational criteria of correlation 
with experience, Tracy understands Christian authentic 
action as requiring a correlation of the Christian classic 
with the contemporary world. 
Hope is the determinate Christian criterion of 
authenticity. In order for an act to be authentically 
Christian it must appropriate the religious classic in 
light of the contemporary situation. The contemporary 
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situation, because it offers both good and evil, requires 
Christian action to respond to the contemporary situation 
with real hope. Both resistance and solidarity are 
components of the hope of the Christian classic. In 
addition to the criteria of resistance and solidarity, 
hope confirms the Christian faith in a loving God. An act 
may be authentic without hope, but it is not authentically 
Christian without hope in the real possibility of a 
relationship with a loving God. 
Though the criteria of authenticity are relatively 
adequate to experience, I still maintain certain 
reservations and criticisms of Tracy's criteria. The 
criteria of authentic action based on a critical stance, 
an analogical imagination, 
plurality and ambiguity 
and an understanding 
of experience; 
misunderstood if interpreted as appropriate 
scholarly endeavors. How does Tracy's argument 
of the 
can be 
to only 
introduce 
such a prejudice? The central underlying problem seems to 
be his overdependence on cognitive structures of 
development and argumentation in his exploration of these 
criteria. Tracy's use of conversation has had the 
tendency to be interpreted as a criteria which judges more 
favorably those who are intellectually better prepared. I 
have stated above, the minimal understanding of 
conversation as a criterion of authenticity, but in spite 
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of conversation's necessity for solidarity it also 
involves an inherent risk of distortion. 
The central criticism of Tracy's work has been that 
it is too cryptic and overly academic. The criticism is 
valid to a point, but there ls also a need to read what 
has been written and not solely the style in which it is 
presented. The real problem may lie in the reception of 
Tracy's texts. Because of the complexity involved in 
Tracy's writings, especially BRO and AI, the audience has 
been mostly intellectuals. Many readers have used Tracy's 
texts inappropriately to support an elitist mentality. In 
Tracy's writings, he is very explicit to renounce such 
elitism and call for conversation with all groups of 
people. 
This 
believe is 
elitism is 
distortion 
learn to 
oppressed. 
of ten those 
oneself .1 
kind of unconscious elitism, I have come to 
not a mere error. Like other distortions, 
both unconscious and systemic. It is a 
whose power will be broken only when we 
hear these alternative readings of the 
The most powerful acts of resistance are 
where the first lesson is to resist 
Here Tracy criticizes those who have interpreted his 
previous texts, as well as any other text, as confirming 
the elite world of scholarly discourse. Authenticity 
demands that we shatter this illusion of elitism in 
theology and enter into a true dialogue about the 
religious tradition of our heritage. 
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The fact is that many people don't read, and they 
experience the world not through a linguistic theoretical 
lens but through a material lens. Their reality is 
defined by a horizon of wet and dry earth, strong crops 
and unwelcome grubs, hard steel and black coal. These 
images, though always expressed in language and 
interpreted by one's linguistic preunderstanding, are 
fundamentally different than the world of thought, idea, 
and argument. The differences between a life lived 
without daylight in the coal mines of West Virginia and 
the life of an academic on a midwest university campus are 
starkly different realities. Only by retaining the 
respect for solidarity and the openness of an analogical 
imagination do Tracy's criteria remain authentic to 
themselves. 
There is a subtle tendency to slip into a pejorative 
attitude towards the "naive" actions of the coalminers, 
steel workers, orange pickers, and taxi drivers in such 
academically oriented criteria of authentic action. This 
limit stands as the largest potential error in Tracy's 
criteria of analogical action. The criteria themselves 
seem ambiguous, since they are both disclosive of the many 
possibilities of authenticity and yet able to be distorted 
as they are received by the academic community. 
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The hope of Analogical Action 
For those who have experienced the need for a 
critical posture 
who have faced 
and a symbolic structure of meaning, and 
the "facts" of radical plurality and 
interruptive ambiguity, on whatever level is individually 
appropriate; analogical action can be a disclosive and 
transformative criterion of judging action. The criteria 
reveal possible ways in which to act authentically. 
Authenticity is not limited to one way of acting, 
thinking, or understanding reality. On the contrary, 
authenticity becomes expansive and encompasses the 
possibilities of transformation present in all religious 
classics. 
Analogical action also allows people to view 
themselves as authentic without needing to inauthenticate 
other points of view. For many Christians there has been 
a new appreciation for the other great religious 
traditions, but these other traditions are often 
understood as inappropriate options for discovering God. 
With Tracy's criteria one may act in light of one's own 
tradition and religious classic, and still view actions of 
other traditions as equally authentic, though very 
different. In this there is hope. Hope that we as a 
world community will neither becoae one uniform people all 
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believing the same tradition or a community of intolerance 
and prejudice. The criteria of solidarity, resistance, 
and hope allow people to live for others and retain their 
own necessary traditions. 
In spite of the many limits of Tracy's criteria, 
analogical action remains a very useful set of criteria 
offering contemporary men and women a model of continual 
transformation. Within these criteria of authenticity, 
the Christian scriptures remain a stable core, but also 
require continual reinterpretation. Likewise, 
intellectual models are internally revised through 
critical reflection and cautioned by the constant need to 
act in solidarity with others. Possibly the most hopeful 
aspect 
they 
of Tracy's criteria of analogical action is 
have a built in requirement of constant revision 
that 
and 
renewal. With a central core of change and conversion, a 
life lived according to the criteria of authenticity will 
never retreat from experience or become deaf to new views. 
In fact, one may face the plurality, ambiguity, and evil 
of the contemporary world with a genuine hope in the 
possibilities of transformation presented in the Christian 
classic. 
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